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Approaches to the Reform 
of the Law of Theft 
L.H. LEIGH* 
Cet article compare les propositions législatives que fait la Commission 
de réforme du droit du Canada (CRD) au sujet du vol, dans son Rapport 
n° 30, avec les dispositions du English Theft Act 1968 et du Model Penal 
Code. 
Dans son examen critique des suggestions de la CRD, l'auteur considère 
d'abord l'élément moral du crime de vol. Il souligne les problèmes qu'a 
soulevés le mot « dishonesty » devant les tribunaux anglais. La simplification 
que la CRD propose, à l'effet de remplacer les expressions anciennes par des 
formulatons plus abstraites, lui semble peu satisfaisante en ce qu 'elle pourrait 
avoir pour effet d'élargir le crime de vol. Ce danger serait d'autant plus grand 
que l'élément moral du vol comprend l'intention de priver temporairement la 
victime de sa propriété. 
Parmi les autres problèmes traités se trouve la notion d'apparence de 
droit reconduite par la CRD. La définition de la propriété semble insatisfaisante 
à l'auteur en ce qu'elle réfère aux biens immobiliers. L'occupation illicite 
d'une propriété doit-elle être considérée comme du vol? Quels seraient alors 
les effets en droit criminel des règles de droit civil relatives au transfert de la 
propriété? Peut-on envisager que des règles de droit criminel autonomes 
pourraient solutionner le problème ? 
En conclusion, l'auteur exprime l'opinion que les suggestions de la CRD 
doivent être réexaminées à la lumière de l'expérience des juridictions sur 
lesquelles elles sont basées. 
* Professor of Criminal Law in the University of London. (The London School of Economics 
and Political Science). 
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Introductory 
There appear to be at least five crucial issues in reforming the law of 
theft. The first is the definition to be adopted; what matters should be 
brought within theft? The second concerns the mental element and in 
particular how and to what extent such terms as "dishonestly" and "fraudulently" 
can be defined. The third concerns the organising principle to be adopted ; 
that, for example of appropriation, or that, allegedly easier to use, of 
trespass '. A fourth concerns its relationship with the civil law ; whether theft 
legislation should, as far as possible be self-contained, or whether it should 
depend upon and thus be intimately linked to a body of civil law principles2. 
A fifth, in practice related to the fourth, though perhaps not necessarily so, is 
whether to strive for a limited number of all inclusive sections, or whether to 
opt for more particular and therefore more numerous, but perhaps more 
readily comprehensible provisions. 
In what follows, I address these issues through the medium of the theft 
proposals contained in the new draft Canadian Criminal Code*. In doing so, 
So contended by G. FI.ETCHIR, Rethinking Criminal Law, Boston, Little, Brown, (1978), 
p. 10 "[...] the murky concept of appropriation [...]". As, however, R.R. STUART, "Law 
Reform and the Reform of the Law of Theft", (1967) 30 M.L.R. 609 noted, the old trespass-
possession structure had, by 1968, been much modified. 
These concerns have most recently been enunciated by Lord Roskillin Reg v. Morris, [ 1984] 
A.C. 320. 
Law Reform Commission of Canada, Recodifying Criminal Law, Report n° 30, 1986. 
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I shall compare the Canadian proposals with those of the Model Penal Code, 
and with English law under the Theft Acts of 1968 and 1978. Many problems 
will be found to be the same or similar, but the solutions differ. Canada of 
course legislates against a distinctive background of case law which allows 
only persuasive value to English judgments though some are influential, and 
within the context of a federal system which entrusts the enactment of 
criminal law to the Centre, but which leaves matters of property and civil 
rights to the provinces4. It follows that what is property will differ from 
province to province, and although this probably causes no difficulty with the 
common law provinces, any formulation must be such as to apply readily to 
the civil law jurisdiction of Quebec as well. Surprisingly, perhaps, this does 
not seem historically to have caused problems. 
1. The Canadian Proposals 
The Canadian proposals deal with theft and fraud in three briefly stated 
propositions, somewhat expanded and, perhaps in the case of fraud with the 
meaning somewhat altered, reproduced in Appendix A as statutory drafts. 
For the sake of completeness I propose to deal with theft as defined in variant 
clauses 13(a) and (b) and with fraud as defined by clause 72 of the draft 
Criminal Code bill. The formulation in proposition 13(c) relating to fraud is 
obviously much wider and deserves discussion in its own right5. 
Proposition 13(1), alternative 1, defines theft as the dishonest appropriation 
of another's property without the other's consent. Proposition 13(2), Obtaining 
services, again reproduced almost verbatim in clause 71 of the draft Code, 
provides that everyone commits a crime who dishonestly obtains for himself 
or another person services from a third party without full payment for them. 
The difference here, from the draft clause, is the absence of the word "full". 
Proposition 13(3) concerning fraud, provides simply that everyone commits a 
crime who, dishonestly, by false representation or by non-disclosure, induces 
another person to suffer an economic loss or risk thereof. This reproduces the 
ratio of Olan6. Draft clause 72, is, however, couched in terms reminiscent of 
false pretences, and appears apt to catch only representations made inter 
partes. It is thus narrower than proposition 13(3) dealing with fraud. I am 
informed that the explanation is that the fraud section of the current Criminal 
Code, s. 338, is thought to be too wide and that a replacement provision cast 
in narrower terms is now under consideration. 
4. Constitution Act, 1867, s. 92(13). 
5. For the sake of convenience, I have reproduced both the propositions in both versions of 
clause 13 and clauses 70-72 of the Criminal Code bill as an appendix to this paper. 
6. The Queen v. Olan, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1175. 
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Alternative 2 of proposition 13 is not illustrated in statutory form. It is 
intended to avoid problems which have arisen in England with the word 
"dishonestly"7 and also to avoid the use of a fault term which is neither 
mentioned nor defined in the general part8. Proposition 13(1) in this variant 
speaks of appropriation without the other's consent and without any right to 
do so. Proposition 13(2) speaks of obtaining services without a right to do so. 
Proposition 13(3) speaks of inducing another person to suffer economic loss 
or risk thereof without any right to do so. 
These rather laconic formulae must be read in conjunction with the 
specifications of fault and the definitions of "property" and "property 
belonging to another" contained in the general part. The basic level of 
culpability, whichever alternative is chosen, is "purpose"9. "Property"includes 
electricity, gas and water and telephone, telecommunication and computer 
services. The latter phrase is not defined, which could prove troublesome. 
Otherwise, the term is evidently wide and comprehends anything which the 
legal system of any of the provinces or of Canada itself are prepared to 
recognise as property. "Another's property" means property that another 
owns or in which he has a legally protected interestl0. Again, the draft Code 
does not seek to specify when a person has a legally protected interest in 
property. Ownership, possession and control would be comprehended, but 
otherwise matters are left to be determined by provincial law. 
The theft propositions are drafted in wide and general terms, and much is 
left to be inferred from them. The commentary is rather brief as indeed is 
that in the Working paper which preceded the report ". No doubt much may 
be inferred ; the report mentions, for example, the defense of claim of right, 
the exclusion of liability for mere puffing, and possible liability for non-
disclosure. I shall, however, seek to show that the result is to leave the reader 
in doubt concerning the possible extension of liability to situations which the 
Model Penal Code and the Criminal Law Revision Committee sought to 
bring within theft. That is not to say that the Law Reform Commission of 
Canada is obliged to accept the policy of another body concerning the proper 
7. For a Canadian discussion of this problem, see J.D. EWART, Criminal Fraud, Toronto, 
Carswell, 1986, p. 166 173 ; for a critical English discussion, see E. GRIEW, The Theft Acts 
1968 and 1978, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1986, paras. 2-110, 2-112. 
8. Supra, note- 3, p. 74. 
9. Supra, note 3, proposition 4(d), and see explanatory notes at p. 75. The defendant must 
mean to misappropriate. The dralt Code, cl I. 10 and 11 specify that a person must mean to 
engage in the conduct in question. 
10. Draft Code, cl. 2(1). 
11. L.R.C. of Canada, Working Paper n° 19. 
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ambit of theft. It does, however, leave the reader in doubt respecting 
important issues. Furthermore, it may be doubted whether, from an operational 
point of view, it is wise to leave so much to inference. A Code must be worked 
by police officers as well as prosecutors, and the former may require explicit 
guidance concerning what falls within it. 
2. Theft 
We may now turn to consider the two alternative drafts of the crime of 
theft of property. The first variation requires a purpose dishonestly to 
appropriate another's property without his consent. The second specifies no 
mental element, but purpose is understood. In full, therefore, everyone 
commits theft who, purposely, appropriates another's property without his 
consent and without any right to do. Common to both is the point that 
appropriation, consistent with existing Canadian law, may be temporary or 
permanent. The general structure of the theft provisions is intended to 
simplify radically the existing law of theft which now consists of a general 
provision and a plethora of particular provisions as well. It merges "takes" 
and "converts" into "appropriates", and it merges "fraudulently and without 
colour of right" into "dishonestly", although the proposed Code does retain a 
separate claim of right formulation in proposition 3(7) n. This structure 
differs from the English Theft Act 1968 in not specifying even partially, save 
for those cases falling under claim of right, cases which are not to be taken as 
dishonest. It differs from the English Act also in not providing extended 
attributions of property interest so as to bring embezzlement and fraudulent 
conversion within theft. This may reflect the belief either that such cases, or 
certain examples of them should not fall within theft, or a belief that the 
wording is apt to cover all those cases which are presently dealt with in 
Canadian criminal law l3. By contrats, the English legislation does at least 
specify certain cases as coming within theft and related offences, though not 
always clearly, while the Model Penal Code and the Draft United States 
Federal Criminal Code state explicitly which of the old crimes they seek to 
bring within theft u . The Canadian proposals are thus very general in their 
12. See for explanation, supra, note 3, p. 75. 
13. On matter can confidently be asserted ; the problems dealt with by the extended property 
attribution provisions of s.5(3) and (4) of the Theft Act 1968 (U.K.) were drawn to the 
L.R.C.'s attention; see A. HOOPER, Theft and Related Offences: Draft Sections and 
Explanatory Notes, Ottawa, Law Reform Commission, 1975, 181p., a study prepared for 
the L.R.C. of Canada. 
14. American Law Institute, Model Penal Code and Commentaries, 1980 ed., Greenawalt, art. 
223.0 and commentary at Pt.II, p. 127-8 ; Draft United States Federal Criminal Code, 1971, 
art. 1731. 
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terms, the meaning of which is apt to require a good deal of elucidation. Some 
part of their ambit may of course be gauged from the context afforded by 
other property crimes, but even this is a partial guide only. The relevance of 
all this will become clearer as this paper progresses. 
3. The Mental Element 
We rely upon the mental element to specify fault, and thus require a 
formula which will enable us to discriminate between those whom we believe 
to be truly at fault and so properly the object of a prosecution, and those who 
are not. Of course the positive specification or purpose does not conclude the 
inquiry ; given a purpose to take, convert, appropriate, or whatever the fault 
term may be, we have then to inquire whether a defeasing condition applies, 
such as claim of right, the owner's consent, necessity, or another general 
defence. 
It is of course possible to define terms strictly and to convict persons who 
cannot invoke a general defence and who take deliberately and without 
mistake property which they know to be that of another. Lord Goddard 
C.J. adopted that position under the Larceny Act 1916 '5, and so do certain 
decisions of Canadian courts including that of the Supreme Court of Canada 
in Lafrancel6. Courts are, however, disinclined to convict persons who 
apparently act without moral fault. For that reason, Lawton L.J. in Feelyll 
departed from Lord Goddard's strict formula, and certain Canadian cases 
seem disposed to follow this lead 18. That tendency could become more 
marked if "dishonestly" is adopted as the fault term 19. There is a natural 
tendency to search for a formula which will avoid the conviction of those 
persons who appear to be morally blameless20. The need is, perhaps, the more 
compelling in Canada where theft can be accomplished by temporary depri-
vation, without qualification. 
15. Regina v. Williams, [1953] 1 Q.B. 660. 
16. LaFrancev. The ßum?,[I975]2S.C.R. 201 ; see also Regina v. Brais, [1972] 5 W.W.R. 671, 
p. 677 per Robertson J. A. 
17. Regina v. Feely, [1973] 1 Q.B. 530. 
18. E.g. per Martin J.A. in Regina v. De Marco, 22 C.R.N.S. 258. 
19. J.D. EWART, supra, note 7, argues that Canadian courts have construed dishonestly as 
meaning acting deliberately and without mistake. The fraud cases from which this derives do 
not, however, define "dishonestly"; see Olan, supra, note 6; Côté v. The Queen, [1986] 1 
S.C.R. 2. See further P. RAINVILLE, "Les aléas de la fraude en droit criminel", (1986) 27 C. de 
D. 813. 
20. See further, D.W. ELLIOTT, "Dishonesty in Theft : A Dispensable Concept", [1982] Crim. L. 
R. 395. 
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The problem can be seen in the so-called "prank" cases where persons 
who took objects temporarily, apparently without moral fault, were convicted 
of theft in strict obedience to the Lafrance formula21. In others, an implied 
exception to Lafrance was apparently asserted22. The problem can be seen 
also in Pace12, where a cook took home a cake which, he alleged, would be 
otherwise disposed of in the rubbish. His story, even if believed the court held, 
revealed no defence to a charge of theft ; the cake had not been abandoned, 
the accused knew that it was the property of his employer, and took it without 
mistake24. By contrast, in Dalzell25 where the accused, allegedly in the 
interests of research, took articles from a shop, intending she said to return 
them after testing the shop's security arrangements, a majority of the Nova 
Scotia court held that her absence of moral fault ought to afford her a 
defence26. In this instance, the court sought to formulate an exception to the 
strict Lafrance rule. 
The question must be whether the Canadian draft adequately caters for 
those cases where the actor's state of mind indicated an absence of moral 
fault. Prosecutorial discretion can, at best, be but a partial solvent of these 
problems, partly because on some of these moral issues a general concensus is 
hard to find, but perhaps more commonly, because the facts do not necessarily 
appear to the prosecutor and the police in the same light as they may 
ultimately appear to the jury. The accused's story may not be obviously true ; 
there may be a substantial triable issue for the jury concerning just what his 
mental element was27. 
The Canadian formula undoubtedly caters for the classic cases at 
common law where the actor would not have been held to have acted 
dishonestly. The cases of finders where the actor believed that the owner 
could not readily be discovered28, of persons believing goods to be abandoned29, 
of cases where the actor believes that the owner would consent if he knew of 
21. E.g. Bogner v. The Queen, 33 C.R.N.S. 348. 
22. The situation as the court in R. v. Rotinsky, (1984) 28 Man. R.(2d) 306 noted, remains 
obscure. 
23. Regina v. Pace, [1965] 3 C.C.C. 55. 
24. This was, no doubt, a harsh result, as A. MEWETT and M. MANNING, Criminal Law, 
Toronto, Butterworths, 1978, 577 p. contend, and in England, under section 2(1)(6) the 
accused would have an arguable defence. 
25. Regina v. Dalzell, 6 C.C.C. (3d) 112. 
26. The court followed Feeley, supra, note 17 ; quare the present status in English law of Regina 
v. Smith, [1960] 2 Q.B. 423. 
27. Pace, supra, note 23, is an obvious example of this. 
28. The Queen v. Slavin, [1900] 7 C.C.C. 175; Regina v. Dubitsky, 135 D.L.R. (3d) 710. 
29. Legge, (1985) 160 A.P.R. 314. 
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the circumstances, and classic cases of claim of right can all be inferred from 
the general concept of dishonesty as the fault element. The issue in these 
instances is simply whether there is instrumental value in specifying them30. 
This proposition needs to be qualified in respect of claim of right, a topic dealt 
with separately below. The issue remains, however, how best we are to deal 
with those residual cases which present a problem of the absence of moral 
fault. 
The English Theft Act 1968 recognises by implication that such cases will 
arise but, like the Canadian draft, does not define "dishonesty", preferring to 
leave the issue to the jury. The tortuous case law which has resulted clearly 
discloses that while the word may appear simple, the concept is not. English 
courts, in an endeavour to presever a subjective formula while controlling it 
by reference to generally accepted moral standards so that the actor cannot 
simply excuse himself by urging that what he did corresponded to his own 
conception of morality, adopt a mixed subjective — objective formula : first, 
was what was done dishonest according to the standards of ordinary reasonable 
people ; secondly, if so, did the actor realise that what he was doing was 
dishonest by those standards. If the accused realised this, his own subjective 
standards are irrelevant ; if he did not, but rather thought that his standards 
were the same as those of reasonable people, he is entitled to be acquitted. 
This is the famous formula in Ghosh31. The problems with it have been 
identified by others; it is complicated, allows the accused's standards to 
govern provided that he believes that his standards and those of humanity in 
general coincide, may lead to arbitrary results given that juries may disagree 
on matters of common morality, and becomes harder to apply the further the 
facts are from very common situations32. It is not, however, a formula which 
is linked uniquely to the word "dishonestly"; it could equally apply to 
"fraudulently" were courts minded so to construe that term as to cater for 
residual cases of non-dishonesty as some Canadian courts have done. Alternative 
2 if read literally may avoid the problems of interpretation noted above, but it 
does so by reverting to the strict Lafrance formula which leaves prosecutorial 
and sentencing discretion as the available solvents of injustice. 
If it is desired to provide for those residual cases where it is assumed that 
there is an absence of moral fault, and which do not fall within the pattern of 
defences offered by the draft Code, the task then is to elaborate a form of 
30. See Model Penal Code, supra, note 14, notes to art. 223 ; Theft Act 1968 (U.K.), s. 2. 
31. Regina v. Ghosh, [1982] 1 Q.B. 1053. 
32. D.W. ELLIOTI, supra, note 20 ; E. GRIEW, supra, note 7, at paras. 2-110, 2-114. Consider 
Green, Greenstein, 61 Cr. App. R. 296 (stagging) which my seminar groups over the years 
find difficult. 
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words which enables the necessary discriminations to be made without the 
formlessness which the undefined adverb presents. The structure adopted 
both by the Model Penal Code and by the United States draft Federal Code is 
to specify knowledge as the culpable mental state, and then to elaborate 
defences. These are reasonably inclusive, for example claim of right, unawareness 
by the actor that he is infringing the property interests of another, taking 
property exposed for sale, and to a limited extent, property in which another 
spouse has an interest. They do not, however, go beyond the cases provided 
for under section 2 of the English Theft Act 1968 and, as the rapporteurs note, 
would not give a defence in a case where the actor takes his employer's money 
in the belief that the owner is indebted to him. Nor would an agent, given 
money by this principal to buy an article have a defence if he buys it for less 
money than the Principal has given him and keeps the difference33. One's 
view of the desirability of this technique, which can be employed whether or 
not the word "dishonestly" is used to signify fault, must depend on whether it 
is thought that the problem cases have been adequately identified and 
properly resolved. In the Canadian proposals it is used without elaboration ; 
under the English Theft Act 1968 it is used in terms which make it clear that 
apart from the examples of lack of fault in section 2, the term "dishonesty" 
has an undefined residual meaning. 
Section 120(1) of the Ghana Criminal Code I960 does indeed endeavour 
to state inclusively and exhaustively when an appropriation is dishonest. It 
provides : 
An appropriation of a thing is dishonest if it is made by a person without claim 
of right, and with a knowledge or belief that the appropriation is without the 
consent of some person for whom he is trustee or who is owner of the thing, as 
the case may be, or that the appropriation would, if known to any such person, 
be without his consent. 
To this provision, the general defences contained in the Code, such as 
necessity, apply. Special provision is made for finders. This appears to be 
reasonably inclusive, at any rate in a Code which requires that the actor 
intend permanently to deprive the victim, and which defines general defences 
in reasonably broad terms. Indeed, it is a blemish in English law that the issue 
of dishonesty under the Theft Act 1968 is determined without reference to the 
ambit of exculpation provided by a developed system of general defences34. 
33. Model Penal Code, supra, note 14 at p. 154-157. 
34. If, for example, Feeley, supra, note 17, had been denied exculpation under an acknowledged 
defence of necessity, it might more readily have been seen that virtually nothing remained 
pointing to an absence of dishonesty. On this case and dishonesty, see G.L. WILLIAMS, 
Textbook of Criminal Law, 2e ed., London, Stevens, 1983, p. 726; in my submission, Prof. 
Williams analysis is cast in misleading terms. 
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Yet another solution is propounded by Professor D.W. Elliott, this time 
founding upon Australian case law35. Put briefly, his solution is treat cases of 
insignificance as not involving dishonesty. He cites as cases which should fall 
outside theft those where the actor takes small sums belonging to another, 
intending or expecting to be able to repay them. The vice here is thought to be 
misuse of an asset rather than an intent permanently to deprive. This 
consideration, whatever force it might otherwise have, is not persuasive in a 
system which treats temporary deprivation generally as theft. But, then, the 
problem is unlikely to arise unless the case is one in which the victim has 
previously made it clear that such takings are forbidden. In such cases we 
ought to beware of assuming that the victim asserts no value which the 
criminal law ought to protect. He may consider that moneys ought never to be 
taken from the till lest a bad example be set and temptation made manifest to 
others. He may, as in Pace, wish to dispose of unwanted articles in a 
particular way. One's doubts are reinforced by Professor Elliott's draft 
clauses : how does a jury determine whether a taking is detrimental to the 
victim's interests in a significant way? What interests are relevant? Does 
significance vary according to the victim's financial position? Would a 
cashier who purloined $ 50.00 from Dominion Stores intending to return it be 
entitled to a defence which a cashier who took the like amount from Patel's 
corner grocery could not raise? No doubt Professor Elliott is correct to say 
that his solution does not present a question of moral estimation without 
guidelines, but it presents practical problems of significance36. 
Should we then abandon the attempt to formulate a residual formula 
and leave hard cases to discretion ? In a sense that would merely substitute the 
moral judgment of the prosecutor or the judge for that of the jury or more 
commonly in Canada to a magistrate who will in most cases have to decide on 
both guilt and punishment. It is, nonetheless, the conclusion which I would 
adopt, at least if temporary deprivation is to continue as theft. If the 
authorities exercise discretion, it may at least be structured for the future by 
rule and example ; if the issue is exclusively for the jury, principles will not be 
elaborated. The issue will be left to their innate and variable common sense. 
If, of course, permanent deprivation alone were to constitute theft, the hard 
cases would be fewer. Most of the meritorious cases already fall within well-
defined common law and statutory defences, and I cannot see that those cases 
which the American Law Institute or Professor Elliott identifies ought to 
benefit from an unstructured residual formula. Employees should not be 
35. Supra, note 20. 
36. A. HOOPER, supra, note 13, advanced a similar suggestion, but would not have premised 
triviality on value alone. The L.R.C. of Canada for which the study was prepared appears 
implicitly to have rejected the suggestion. 
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encouraged to abstract money on a plea of set off; an agent should not be 
entitled to pocket the saving which he has made on the purchase of an article ; 
employers should not be put at risk of an employee's belief in his ability to 
repay37. 
4. Claim of Right 
Claim of right is treated in the draft Code as a specific example of 
mistake of law. The wording, which is meant to reflect existing Canadian law, 
is broad and undefined : 
3(7) Mistake of Ignorance of Law. No one is liable for a crime committed by 
reason of mistake or ignorance of law : (a) concerning private rights relevant to 
that crime [...] 
It is, I submit, quite unclear what this wording seeks to do, first because it 
purports to reflect existing law which is in fact in an unsettled state despite 
overconfident claims to the contrary38, and secondly because the phrase 
"private rights" is potentially wider than the notion adopted in the Model 
Penal Code or under the American Draft Federal Criminal Code of honest 
belief in a claim to property39. It is of course not necessarily wider than the 
phrase used in s. 2( 1 ){a) of the Theft Act 1968, but that provision has not been 
tested in the courts. It may fit uneasily with the rest of the mistake of law 
defence which the draft provides. It is of course easy to see that claim of right 
as formulated under the American proposals makes manifest what is already 
necessarily included in the requirement that one intend to appropriate 
another's property40. 
37. Of course hard cases can be put. For example, if I tell my employee never to take money from 
the till, and he being broke, does so in order to buy a Metro ticket which he needs in order to 
deliver items from my business, the case might technically be theft unless the trier of fact were 
to conclude that whatever my words, I would not have minded had I known the full facts, but 
in any event, would proceedings ever be brought ? In some of the prank cases, Bogner, supra, 
note 21, for example, the case was much less clear cut. The accused were drunk, they threw 
the article away when approached, and had previous convictions. Casey J. alone thought 
that the prosecurtion came close to an abuse of process. A. HOOPER, supra, note 13, p. 169, 
would have exempted "borrowing" of money from the employer's till from theft, but this is 
obviously dangerous. 
38. E.g. D. STUART, Canadian Criminal Law, Agincourt, Carswell, 1982, p. 276-279. 
39. Draft United States Federal Criminal Code, s. 1739 ; Model Penal Code, supra, note 14, s. 
223.1(3)(a). 
40. Model Penal Code, supra, note 14, p. 153. 
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It is clear in Canadian law that claim of right involves, in its classic sense, 
a claim that the property is legally that of the actor41, and extends also to a 
claim that the actor is entitled to deal with property in a certain way. Thus, a 
Bank which unlawfully covered a customer's overdraft with a social security 
cheque, believing that it had a right to do so was held not guilty of theft42. In 
Lilly43 a real estate broker's defence to a theft charge, that he believed that he 
was entitled to transfer deposit moneys from trust to general account once an 
offer to purchase property had been accepted, was held to be valid. 
Claim or colour of right is also used in a wider sense to convey the idea 
that an actor who believes that the owner would not object to the taking 
cannot be convicted of theft44. As Martin J. A. noted in DeMarco*5, the term 
when used in the sense of an honest belief in a state of facts which if it existed 
would justify or excuse the act done is merely a particular application of the 
doctrine of mistake of fact. Indeed, both classes of case can readily be brought 
within the general wording of the theft propositions without explicit reference 
to colour of right, the former because the actor asserts that the property is his, 
or in the dealing cases asserts also that he acts honestly in respect of the 
property, the latter because the actor's claim bears upon honesty46. 
The puzzle is to know how much farther proposition 3(7)(a) is meant to 
take us. The meaning of the phrase "private rights", even in this context, is 
unclear47. It is submitted, however, that the essence of the actor's claim is that 
he acted without mens rea which must, of course mean without the fault 
element required for the offence48. Historically, this has involved "fraudulently 
and without colour of right"; under the draft proposals it may involve an 
open-ended concept of dishonesty, and there is a sense in which the whole 
discussion must be circular unless the concept of fault is given some objective 
definition. Certain Canadian commentators and courts seem to suggest a 
wider meaning which is not limited by the notional of purposive action in 
respect to the external elements of the offence and which is, indeed, apt to 
41. Regina v. Hemmerly, 30 C.C.C. (2d) 141 ; Polchies, (1985) 165 A.P.R. 386 ; R. v. Wright and 
Wright, 41 Alta. L.R. (2d) 361. 
42. Chapdelaine c. Bérubé, [1985] CS . 980. 
43. Lilly v. the Queen, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 794. 
44. Pace, supra, note 23 ; Legge, (1985) 160 A.P.R. 314. 
45. Supra, note 18. 
46. Kastratovic, (1986) 19 A. Crim. R. 28. Indeed, MEWETT and MANNING, supra, note 24, 
p. 289, very sensibly suggest that one ought to look at whether the mistake relates to an 
essential element of the crime. 
47. G. WILLIAMS, Criminal Law. the General Part, 2 ed., London, Stevens, 1961 p. 305. 
48. Id., p. 322. 
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break down the distinction between errors of fact and of law in this context. 
Nonetheless, there is common law authority for the wider view49. 
The debate centres around the decision of Rand and Fauteux JJ. in 
Shymkowich, a decision more often abused than analysed50. The accused 
removed logs from a booming ground. The logs were not at large in the river. 
The accuses alleged no property interest in them. He knew that they were not 
lost. He knew that they were owned by a company which could establish title 
to them, and that he had no right to them deriving from the company. His 
defence was based on an inaccurate recollection that a provincial government 
pamphlet concerning beachcombing gave him a legal right to take logs. Rand 
and Taschereau JJ . charracterised this as a belief in a general legal right to 
collect logs. Accordingly, they rejected it as a defence. Mistake of law alone 
will not, they hold, suffice. Rand J. sums up claim of right thus5 1 : 
A claim to ownership of a chattel, although it may depend on matter of law, is, 
in most cases, a question of fact, or its legal basis may, in the ordinary sense of 
the word, be subsumed in "fact". This enhances the difficulty of separating legal 
from factual elements in any relation to property and in any case it may resolve 
itself into a refined conceptual distinction. But a distinction between justifying 
an act as authorized by law and as a bona fide belief in a property interest does 
seem to correspond with an instinctive discrimination between the two concepts. 
Estey and Fauteux JJ . disposed of the case on the facts ; the accused lacked an 
honest and reasonable belief in the existence of facts which would have made 
his belief reasonable. What those facts might be remained unexpressed and 
their Lordships may indeed have assumed the law to be as their colleagues 
formulated it. Locke J. dissented, holding that the issue ought to be whether 
the accused really believed, on whatever grounds, that he had a right to the 
logs ; that he really believed them to be his own. His Lordship's judgment may 
thus be internally contradictory. 
There is much to be said for the position adopted by Rand and 
Taschereau JJ . It corresponds to the value which underlies the Model Penal 
Code formulation, that a person who believes that he owns or perhaps has a 
right of disposition over a thing poses no threat to the proprietary interests of 
others52. Furthermore, its limits are reasonably discernible. Professor Glanville 
49. The English authorities are discussed by King C. J. in Langham, (1984) 12 A. Crim. R. 391. 
The wider doctrine does not seem to correspond to the justification for colour of right in 2 
East P.C. 659, that a man's life should not be put in jeopardy because of a property dispute. 
50. The Queen v. Shymkowich [1954] S.C.R. 606 ; for comment see D. STUART, supra, note 38, 
p. 276; G.L. WILLIAMS, supra, note 47, p. 324-325; see A. MANGANAS and G. CÔTÊ-
HARPER, Droit Pénal Canadien, Cowansville, Éd. Yvon Biais inc., 1984, p. 463-464. 
51. Supra, note 50, p. 608-609. 
52. Model Penal Code, supra, note 14, p. 153. 
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Williams argues that the proper course is to acquit with a warning those who 
are genuinely ignorant of the civil law53. This, if taken far enough, could 
produce bizarre consequences in other contexts54. Could a father argue that 
he has a property in his daughter which would entitle him to imprison her 
unless and until she agrees to marry a chosen suitor ? Would he, if charged 
with false imprisonment, be entitled to an acquittal coupled with a warning? 
What should the general rules of mistake of law contain? 
My principal concern in this context is, however, to point out that 
Canadian law is in an uncertain state. The judgment of Rand and Taschereau 
JJ. was not accepted in Howson55. The accused removed the victim's car 
which was unlawfully parked in a private parking lot at the instance of the 
lot's proprietor and declined to give it up to the victim until the latter paid 
parking and towing charges. He was charged with theft and convicted. On 
appeal, the conviction was quashed. Porter C. J.O. (Evans J. concurring) held 
that the accused was entitled to be acquitted if he honestly but mistakenly 
believed that he had a right in law or in fact to take the vehicle. Their 
Lordships thus rejected the test in Shymkowich ; an accused may found upon 
mistake of law, fact, or mixed law and fact. Laskin J. treated colour of right 
by virtue of the word "fraudulently" as referring to belief in matters either of 
law or fact justifying the challenged taking or detention. Here, the accused 
could rely on a mistaken belief that he had a right from the owner of the 
parking lot to detain the car. In Pace56, not truly a claim or right case, the Nova 
Scotia court preferred the judgment of Rand and Taschereau JJ. in Shymko-
wich, to that of Locke J. A later court concludes that it is not clear whether 
Howson has settled the law against Shymkowich, given the existence of 
contradictory provincial decisions57. In addition, it may be urged that 
Howson is less clear than it seems. The right urged can be seen as derived from 
that assumed by the proprietor of the parking lot, to detain vehicles left by 
trespass, until payment of compensation. Thus viewed, the right asserted is at 
least asserted in virtue of possession. But whether or not Howson can be thus 
interpreted, there is an ambiguity in the Canadian case law which the draft 
does not resolve. If it be urged that mistake of law as to private rights is used 
simply in order to extend the defence beyond that which would be assumed to 
exist where the person does not intend to take property belonging to another, 
one must ask why this extension is desired? What are the values in issue? 
53. G.L. WILLIAMS, supra, note 47, p. 325. 
54. Note that proposition 3(7) is limited only by the unsatisfactory expression "private rights 
relevant to that crime". 
55. Regina v. Howson, [1966] 2 O.R. 63. 
56. Supra, note 23. 
57. R. v. Gruber, [1982] 1 W.W.R. 197, p. 256 per Stuart T.C.J. 
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What are the boundaries of the defence to be ? Certainly they go far beyond 
the proposed rules for mistake of law generally. If, as a result of an erroneous 
reading of the Morgentaler case58,1 believe that I have a right to perform an 
abortion without obeying the statutory requirements, I may expect to be 
convicted. Why should my case be different if, relying on a garbled memory of 
a government pamphlet, I appropriate logs which are not mine, are in 
another's booming area, bear the other's mark, and are, to my knowledge, 
not abandoned ? 
5. Temporary Deprivation 
The mental element, as noted, consists of a purpose to deprive the owner 
either permanently or temporarily of his interest in property. The breadth of 
this should perhaps be reconsidered. Both section 6 of the English Theft Act 
1968 (not a desirable drafting model) and the American proposals allow such 
an intent only in special circumstances, as for example where the actor means 
to appropriate a major portion of the economic value of a thing, or to dispose 
of it under a condition as to its return which the actor may not be able to 
fulfill 59. 
I suggest reconsideration for three reasons. 
First, most of these cases do not seem serious enough to justify being 
treated as theft, still after all, regarded as a serious offence. Second, the 
requirement of only temporary deprivation makes the problem of encapsulating 
the notion of dishonesty in the Code even harder than it would otherwise be. 
Third, it produces major problems when dealing with joy-riding, the essence 
of which is also temporary deprivation. In Lafrance60 the Supreme Court 
accepted that there was substantial overlap between the two offences, but still 
thought that they might be distinguished. Fauteux C.J. concurring, thought 
that the difference between the two offences is that in joy-riding unlike theft, 
the actor means to return or cause the vehicle to be returned to its owner. This 
hardly seems realistic ; in many cases the actor will simply be indifferent to the 
matter. Laskin J. (Hall and Spence J. concurring) dissenting, thought that in 
joy-riding the actor does not act fraudulently towards the owner, but it is 
unclear what they thought fraudulently should mean, and there is a danger of 
latent circularity in the argument. The result is, however, either to narrow joy-
riding to the unrealistic case where the actor intends to return the vehicle, or 
58. Morganlaler v. the Queen, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 616. 
59. Model Penal Code, supra, note 14, s. 223.0(1), p. 164-165. See also A. HOOPER, supra, note 
13, p. 47. 
60. Supra, note 16. 
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to admit a wide and undesirable measure of police and prosecutorial discretion 
in the choice of charges. The difference between a conviction for theft of the 
lesser offence may turn on the way in which the actor responded to the police. 
6. The External Elements 
The external elements, of appropriation of another's property without 
his consent, also present difficulties. The existing Criminal Code uses the 
phrase fraudulently takes or fraudulently converts61. This does not seem to 
have caused problems in practice. The Model Penal Code and the United 
States Federal Draft Code are cast in terms of knowingly taking or exercising 
unauthorised control over property, or making an unauthorised transfer of 
it62. The rapporteurs note to the Model Penal Code (1980 edition) does not 
suggest any difficulty with the term. By contrast, "appropriation" has caused 
considerable difficulties in England. The House of Lords in Morris61, defines 
the term to mean interference with or usurpation of the rights of an owner64. 
That does not seem to correspond with the Law Reform Commission's view, 
for the explanatory notes say this65 : 
The gist of theft is not the taking or the converting itself. These are only modes 
of doing what theft seeks to prohibit, that is, usurping the owner's rights — 
appropriating another's property. Hence clause 13(1) singles out appropriation 
as the kernel of the crime. 
The essence of appropriation on this view is thus usurpation of the owner's 
rights. Does right include any right ? The Theft Act 1968 uses such a formula 
in order to ensure that the non-theftuous possessor who converts property 
which he holds commits theft. That situation is caught by the present 
Criminal Code, and would be caught directly by the Model Penal Code as 
well. Why alter the basic structure ? Especially as the House of Lords formula 
both causes operational difficulties (when does a label switcher commit 
theft?) and makes it virtually impossible to reconcile the cases on when 
61. Criminal Code, s. 289. 
62. Model Penal Code, supra, note 14, s. 223.2(1) (2); Draft United States Federal Criminal 
Code,%. 1732. 
63. Supra, note 2, p. 340. 
64. E. GRIEW, supra, note 7, para. 2-58 n. 90 suggests that the phrase "adverse interference [...] 
or usurpation cannot properly be read disjunctively, but should be taken as referring to 
usurpation though. This, however would not fit the label switcher who fundamentally 
acknowledges the owner's title, but who hopes to obtain the property by perpetrating a fraud 
upon him. 
65. Supra, note 3, p. 75. 
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appropriation occurs66. The label switching cases have, for example, been 
perfectly satisfactorily resolved in Canada ; such conduct is regarded as an act 
preparatory to the crime of obtaining by false pretences, and the accused is 
accordingly arrested as he passes through the cashier67. Furthermore, it is at 
least odd that one of the concerns in Morris, that of whether appropriation 
can be a purely mental operation vis-à-vis the property concerned, a very old 
problem in the law of theft by a bailee, was not met by the Law Reform 
Commission to whose attention the point had earlier been directed68. 
Conversely, there are obvious problems with the present law of theft 
which the proposed draft will not touch. Consistently with the old law of 
larceny, the existing theft sections are so construed as to reflect the historic 
distinction between false pretences and larcency by a trick69. Consequently, 
where the transaction serves to pass possession but not property, the crime is 
theft only70. Recourse to difficult doctrines of civil law is and will be 
inevitable. The undesirability of this has often been emphasized by English 
courts, whose well-meaning attempts to do so have produced notable distortions 
of doctrine7I. The proposed draft, by using the phrase "another's property"72 
makes it inevitable that this will cause difficulty for, obeying the rule that the 
mental element and the external elements must coincide, a court will be 
obliged to inquire into the state of property right at the moment of 
appropriation73. 
The Law Reform Commission's documents neither indicate that this 
problem was ever considered, nor that suggestions have been made to 
overcome it. It has, for example, been suggested that the problem might be 
resolved by providing that in all cases where a trick is used, ownership would 
not pass or the contract would be void, so that the result would be theft 
only74. Conversely, section 136(1) of the Ghana Criminal Code simply 
provides that if the owner or person having authority to part with a thing 
66. See L.H. LEIGH, "Some Remarks on Appropriation in the Law of Theft After Morris", 
(1985)48 M.L.R. 167. 
67. Regina v. Dawood, 27 C.C.C. (2d) 300; Regina v. Klopping, 57 C.C.C. (2d) 574. 
68. A. HOOPER, supra, note 13, p. 40; see further, L.H. LEIGH, supra, note 66, p. 172-174. 
69. This distinction is presently recognised in Canadian law ; Regina v. Hemingway, (1955) 112 
C.C.C. 321 ; Riga c. R, [1977] C.A. 408. 
70. Dawood, supra, note 67. 
71. Morris, supra, note 2. 
72. Defined in proposition 1(2) to mean property that another owns or has any legally protected 
interest in. 
73. For a short discussion of the problems encountered in England, see J.C. SMITH, The Law of 
Theft, 5th ed., London, Butterworths, 1984, paras. 35 s. 
74. RR. STUART, supra, note 1, p. 620. 
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gives consent to the appropriation of it by the accused, then, although such 
consent has been obtained by deceit, the accused person shall not be deemed 
guilty of theft, but may be convicted of having defrauded by false pretences. 
Consent, by s. 136(2) is an unconditional consent to the immediate and final 
appropriation of the thing by the accused person, by way of gift or barter, or 
of sale on credit to the accused person. 
This sort of provision or the converse suggestion that property be 
deemed not to pass, has the merit of directing the police officer's or 
prosecutor's mind to the appropriate crime to charge. Admittedly, under 
English law, obtaining by criminal deception may be charged whatever the 
nature of the property interest obtained, but that has not prevented operational 
problems75. Under draft clause 72 of the Canadian proposal, the situation is, 
perhaps, even less clear, for it speaks of inducing a person to part with his 
property. This probably refers to possession, but is ambiguous enough to be 
interpreted as meaning the victim's property interest. 
Further problems concern the case where the owner acts under a mistake 
of which the actor was aware, but which he did nothing to induce. It is well-
known that in English law, the courts have not used the extended property 
attribution provisions of section 5, but have simply held, thus reforming the 
law in a rather unexpected way, that no property passes to an actor who takes 
with knowledge of the owner's mistake76. Taking under the owner's mistake 
has also proved to be a problem in Canadian law. In two cases an accused, 
who was erroneously credited by his bank with large sums, drew out the 
money and spent it. In one case, Johnson11, the accused was convicted of 
theft. It seems clear that Freedman, Matas, and Monnin JJ.A. considered 
that no property passed in the money, but without specifying their reasons. 
Their Lordships found it unnecessary to decide whether the theftuous act was 
the taking or the conversion. Hall J. A. relied upon Middleton78 holding that 
the cashier's consent to pass the money was mistaken, and that the accused's 
dishonest taking advantage of her nullified her consent. Sullivan J. A. dissented. 
On the other hand, in Lavery79, admittedly a decision of a lower court, and on 
the same facts, the court held that the cashier had full authority to pass over 
the money and that any conversion took place after property passed. The 
crime could not, therefore, be theft. This decision founds, not unreasonably, 
75. Lawrence v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, [1972] A.C. 626. 
76. Gilks, 56 Cr. App. R. 734. 
77. Regina v. Johnson, 88 D.L.R. (3d) 692, (CA.). 
78. (1873) L.R. 2 C.C.R. 38. 
79. R. v. Lavery, 45 CR. (3d) 93 (D.C Ont.). 
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on the label switching cases which are premised on property having passed. 
Further to complicate matters, Brochu80 seems to suggest that a person who 
receives property by another's error does not obtain title to it so that a later 
dishonest dealing with it can be theft. This, of course, runs counter to the 
English authorities, and seems at variance with common law doctrines 
concerning the passing of property81. 
A further set of problems concern one who obtains goods for which 
payment is customarily required on the spot, and who drives off without 
paying. This is of course specially dealt with in English law82. The difficulty 
arises at self-service stations where the actor obtains gasoline or a similar 
commodity, without dishonest intent at that moment and therefore without 
employing a deception. If he then leaves without payment, there may be 
neither theft, for property passed before he formed a dishonest attempt, nor 
deception. The problem in essence is one of civil law ; when did property 
pass ? Canadian authority is robust. First, there is a disinclination to find that 
the accused may have acted honestly when putting gasoline into the tank. 
Secondly, and more questionably, it has been held that a service station 
retains a special property or interest in the gasoline until payment is made. 
But if property passed under the local Sale of Goods Act before the dishonest 
intent was formed, what property interest can the owner have ? He has, surely, 
only a right to require payment83. 
None of this is to suggest that the solutions embodied in the English 
Theft Act 1968 should be adopted in Canada. I draw attention to them only 
because it is not obvious whether the Law Reform Commission has seen the 
problems. The matter is not simply technical. In a case where no deception is 
used, the question whether dishonest retention should be punished at all, and 
if so on what conditions, is of fundamental importance. In some cases, the 
answer is easy ; no-one would have qualms about convicting the person who 
drives away from the gasoline pump without payment or excuse. In other 
cases, perhaps of an undefined restitutionary nature, where a person keeps 
property or proceeds which by virtue of the civil law he should return to 
another, the answer is more doubtful84. 
80. Brochu v. The King, (1950) 10 CR. 183. 
81. Moynesv. Coopper, [1956] 1 Q.B. 439; Attorney-General's Reference (n° I of 1983), [1984] 
Crim. L. R. 570; see Theft Act 1968 (U.K.), s. 5(4). Brochu does not appear to turn on any 
doctrine peculiar to the civil law of Québec. 
82. Theft Act 1978, s. 3. 
83. R. v. Pratt, (1983), 26 Sask. R. 268; see R. v. Badger, (1983), 19 Sask. R. 316. 
84. See further, R.R. STUART, supra, note I. 
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The Canadian proposals are also unique in not differentiating between 
movable and immovable property, or what can and what cannot be the 
subject matter of theft. The Model Penal Code and later American reform 
propose movable property as capable of theft by taking or by the exercise of 
control, but treat immovable property as capable of theft only by transfer85. 
The English Theft Act 1968 is even more restrictive86. The Canadian proposals 
have the great advantage that any dishonest transfer can be brought within 
theft. One would not, for example, have to worry about the status of the 
transferor or the precise nature of any authorisation upon which he might 
rely. 
On the other hand, there is no recognition of the reason which led the 
American Law Institute to reject a general assimilation of movable and 
immovable property, that is, the undesirability of including unlawful use or 
occupancy of land, perhaps by an overholding tenant, within theft. The 
rapporteur states87 : 
The immobility and virtual indestructibility of real estate makes unlawful 
occupancy of land a relatively minor harm for which civil remedies supplemented 
by mild criminal sanctions for trespass should be adequate. 
The problem is surely potentially more difficult in Canada where, as the 
proposals now stand, intent to deprive temporarily will suffice for theft. Any 
temporary dispossession of my neighbour from any part of his property 
would, seemingly, fall within the theoretical ambit of theft, squatters would 
become thieves, and the police could be called upon to intervene in situations 
of social unrest to which the civil law seems better adapted. 
A final point on property involves the status of confidential information. 
In both Canada and England it is held not to be property of the purposes of 
theft, and the reform proposals will not alter this88. Canadian law with its 
concept of temporary deprivation will at least protect against unauthorised 
removal for copying89. There is, no doubt, a need for an offence serious 
enough to reflect the gravity of much industrial espionage. Fraud, as defined 
in proposition 13(3) would not do. In such a case the victim would not 
necessarily be induced to suffer an economic loss or the risk thereof. In any 
event, the proposal does not seek to define or describe economic loss. It seems 
85. Model Penal Code, supra, note 14, s. 223.2 ; Draft United States Federal Criminal Code, s. 
1741(f). 
86. Theft Act 1968 (U.K.), s. 4; J.C. SMITH, supra, note 73, paras. 87-112. 
87. Model Penal Code, supra, note 14, p. 172. 
88. Regina v. Stewart, 138 D.L.R. (3d) 73 ; Oxford v. Moss, 68 Cr. App. R. 183. 
89. This clearly falls outside the ambit of section 6 of the Theft Act 1968 (U.K.) ; R. v. Lloyd, 
[1985] 2 All ER 661. 
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doubtful whether all infringements of trademarks, patents and designs should 
be treated as crimes. Infringements of copyright are comonly treated as 
summary conviction offences both in common law and civil law systems90. 
But the infringements involved in these matters do not respond to traditional 
concepts of theft and fraud and, furthermore, need to be discussed in terms of 
policy, not resolved by artificial adaptation of concepts from seemingly 
cognate areas of criminal law. 
7. Obtaining Services 
Here, the Canadian proposal is in part loosely drafted. Clearly, the draft 
encompasses only services rendered for consideration. In that, it follows 
proposals elsewhere. The offence is, helpfully, so drafted as not to require a 
deception. It thus avoids the complications involved in specifying the mode of 
dishonesty and is clearly broad enough to encompass cheating a machine91. It 
is, furthermore, apt to cover the case where a person having control over the 
services of another, diverts them to his own use or that of his nominee. 
The proposal is unsatisfactory in the following respects. First, "services" 
is left undefined. In this, it differs from the Model Penal Code which, 
admittedly, employs a wide residual definition of services as anything that can 
be classified as a service, but which specifically instances labour, professional 
services, transportation, telephone or other public service, accomodation in 
hotels, restaurants or elsewhere, admission to exhibitions, the use of vehicles 
and other movable property92. No doubt most or all of these would be 
understood as comprehended within services, but it might nonetheless be 
better, from an operational point of view, to spell them out. Secondly, there 
may be virtue in the presumption of dishonesty contained in the American 
proposals which applies against an absconder where payment is normally 
made immediately after the services are rendered93. This is not, however, of 
critical importance ; in most such cases, dishonesty will readily be inferred. 
A third criticism concerns casting the offence in terms of not making 
payment, rather than in terms of obtaining services intending not to pay, or 
by means to employed to avoid payment. The draft presents two problems in 
90. A. MATTFELD, "Protection of Software Against Third Parties in the Federal Republic of 
Germany", 1 Software Law Journal 341 (1986). 
91. A problem in England; see E. GRIEW, supra, note 7, para. 6-15 ; on the other hand, where 
theft of property is concerned the Australian High Court has held, in Kennison v. Daire 60 
A.L.J.R. 249 that a cash dispensation by a machine which is dishonestly used by a person 
without an account does not pass property. Griew's statement may, therefore, be too wide. 
92. Model Penal Code, supra, note 14, s. 223.7 ; note that neither the Draft Federal Code nor the 
English Theft Act 1978 define the term. 
93. Model Penal Code, id. ; Draft United States Federal Criminal Code (1971) s. 1733. 
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this respect. The first concerns the use of "full" payment in both drafts of 
proposition 13. Draft clause 71 simply specifies that the person obtain a 
service "and does not pay for it." Is any different meaning intended ? The first 
variant would exempt from the offence someone, however dishonest, made 
partial payment only. The second variant would enable the conviction of 
someone who dishonestly seeks to avoid partial payment for services rendered, 
perhaps because he has repented of his bargain. This needs explanation. 
Secondly, save in the case where compensation is usually made immediately, 
at what time does one conclude that services have not been paid for? Here, 
surely, is fertile ground for evasion on the one hand, bullying on the other, 
and operational confusion as police officers seek to determine whether a 
matter is or is not essentially civil94. 
8. Fraud 
Space precludes any extended discussion of either proposition 13(3) or 
draft clause 72 relating to fraud, but the following points may be noted. First, 
the crime is essentially a deception offence in the latter but not the former 
variant. If it is to be a deception offence it will be much narrower than the 
existing provision, section 3389S. Secondly, it seems odd that both theft and 
obtaining services are cast in terms of "dishonesty" simpliciter, while fraud is 
cast in terms of false representations and omissions96. Third, as argued 
above, "to part with his property" is ambiguous. Fourth, the present Criminal 
Code provision concerning false pretences has a presumption against one 
who gives an n.s.f. cheque. Is the omission of this presumption intentional, or 
has it been overlooked ? Finally, a point arising under draft clause 84, ought it 
not to be an offence to possess articles which could be used to forge cheques 
and credit cards ? 
Conclusions 
I am conscious that this is both long and incomplete. I have tried to 
locate those points of difficulty which Canadian experience and comparative 
research suggest may arise under the draft proposals. Inevitably, there is 
much that I have not forseen and doubtless more that I have not appreciated. 
I have, I hope, said enough to assist the debate which the draft Criminal Code 
seems certain to provoke. 
94. I would not contend that these difficulties are absent under s. 223 of the Model Penal Code ox 
under s. 1 of the Theft Act 1978, but they are limited by the necessity of showing that the 
actor employed one of the means referred to in the provisions. 
95. See in general J.D. EWART, supra, note 19. 
96. In this respect it appears to owe parentage to s. 223.3 of the Model Penal Code. Indeed, the 
detailed drafting is such as to reproduce most of that measure's points. 
